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RECENT DECISIONS

DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-PRIOR DEATH OF WRONGDOER- Plaintiff
sued for her intestate's death and conscious suffering negligently caused by
defendant's intestate in an auto collision in New York. The trial judge directed
a verdict for defendant on the theory that there was no evidence that defendant's
intestate was still alive at the moment plaintiff's intestate was injured, and
therefore no evidence of any cause of action, arising against the former in his
lifetime, which could survive his death. Held, exceptions to the directed verdict
overruled since the applicable New York death and survival statutes 1 do not
provide for the continuance of a cause of action which has arisen subsequent
to the wrongdoer's death. Silva v. Keegan, (Mass. 1939) 23 N. E. (2d) 867.

1 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1939), "Decedent Estate Law," § 130:
"The executor or administrator ••.of the decedent who has left him or her surviving
a husband, wife, or next of kin, may maintain an action to recover damages for a
wrongful act, neglect or default, by which the decedent's death was caused, against a
natural person who, or a corporation which, would have been liable to an action in
favor of the decedent by reason thereof if death had not ensued." And § n8: "No
cause of action for injury to person or property shall be lost because of the death of
the person liable for the injury. • •• This section shall extend to a cause of action
for wrongfully causing death and an action therefor may be brought or continued
against the executor or administrator of the person liable therefor."
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In conformity with the common-law maxim, that a personal tort action dies
with the death of either the person injured or the wrongdoer, no action would
lie to recover damages for the wrongful death of a person. 2 To uproot this
:firmly established rule, Parliament passed the Lord Campbell Act, 8 giving to
certain beneficiaries a right of action to recover damages for death caused by
wrongful act. This statute has.been copied in one way or another by the several
states in this country.4 Because of the variance in the statutory language from
state to state a general statement would not be accurate, but in the main it has
been held that such a statute creates a new cause of action, and is not a mere
survival of the cause of action previously possessed by the deceased. 5 Being in
derogation of the common law, and therefore strictly construed, this statutory
right of action in a majority of states has been held to abate, pursuant to the
common law, upon the death of the person liable.6 Under the principle that
remedial statutes should be construed liberally, some courts have interpreted
their survival statutes to include actions for wrongful death.7 Fact situations
similar to that of the principal case, where the wrongdoer predeceases the time
of injury to the guest, encounter the logical doctrine that a cause of action must
arise against a living person to exist at all. 8 If the cause of action arising under
the wrongful death statutes is predicated on the wrongful act,9 then, since
defendant's intestate in the principal case was alive when he committed the
negligent act, a cause of action must have accrued against him. On the other
hand, if the cause of action is predicated on the death of the person injured,
and the New York courts adhere to this view,10 then the decision in the prin17 C. J. II81 (1919).
9 & IO Vjct., c. 93 (1846).
4 For example, see N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1939), "Decedent Estate
Law," § 130, quoted supra in note 1.
_
5 See cases cited in 17 C. J. u85, note 38 (1919).
6 Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E. 787 (1885); Moe v. Smiley,
125 Pa. 136, 17 A. 228 (1889); Hamilton v. Jones, 125 Ind. 176, 25 N. E. 192
(1890); Davis v. Nichols, 54 Ark. 358, 15 S. W. 880 (1891); Bates v. Sylvester,
205 Mo. 493, 104 S. W. 73 (1907); Clark v. Goodwin, 170 Cal. 527, 150 P. 357
(1915).
1 ln Devine v. Healy, 241 III. 34, 89 N. E. 251 (1909), the court, citing
Holton v. Daly, 106 III. 131 (1882), said that the cause of action under the death
statute was the wrongful act, not merely the death itself, and held that the action
would survive the death of the tortfeasor under the survival statute. Accord: Putnam
v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83, 138 N. E. 808 (1923); and Hackensack Trust Co. v.
Vanden Berg, 88 N. J. L. 518, 97 A. 148 (1916), in which the wrongful death
action was said to be founded upon a "trespass to the person" within the terms of
the New Jersey survival statute.
Some statutes expressly provide for the survival of such actions; for example,
see N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1939), "Decedent Estate Law," § u8, quoted
supra in note I.
8 Kearney v. Boston & Worcester R. R., 9 Cush. (63 Mass.) 108 (1851); and
see 1 C. J. 181 (1914).
9 See note 7, supra.
10 Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258, 1 N. E. 787 (1885); Whitford v.
Panama R. R., 23 N. Y. 465 (1861). See also the cases cited supra, in note 6, as
representative of the majority view.
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cipal case is sequent and consistent.11 It is submitted, however, that the New York
death statute was susceptible of the interpretation that the wrongful act is the
basis of the cause of action.12 But at this point the years of adherence by the
New York courts to the majority view requires legislative action to further the
policy of the Lord Campbell Act, which is to compensate certain beneficiaries for
the death of the injured person. It is interesting to note, in passing, that the
Massachusetts and Wisconsin legislatures already have heeded the suggestions of
their respective supreme courts in cases similar to the principal one 18 by amending their statutes in order to permit a recovery in such a case.14

11 In accord with principal case: Beavers' Admx. v. Putnam's Curator, I IO Va.
713, 67 S. E. 353 (1910); Willard v. Mohn, 24 N. D. 390, 139 N. W. 979
(1913); Hegel v. George, 218 Wis. 327, 259 N. W. 862, 261 N. W. 14 (1935);
Martinelli v. Burke, (Mass. 1937) xo N. E. (2d) II3.
In Kerr v. Basham, 62 S. D. 301 at 304-305, 252 N. W. 853 (1934), the
court said: "The liability of Basham existed in contingent and inchoate form from and
after the moment that he inflicted the injury; the condition subsequent which was
necessary to ripen such contingent liability into a cause of action being the death of
Bennett as a result of the injury. When Bennett died from the injury, the liability
previously contingent became absolute, and the cause of action accrued against Basham,
if living (with survival against his estate, if he subsequently died), or against Basham's
estate, as such, if he had predeceased Bennett. In view of the language of our statute,
we do not believe it was intended that the existence of the cause of action for wrongful
death should depend upon whether or not the wrongdoer survived his victim." The
statute provided that the person who "would have been liable, if death had not
ensued, or the administrator or executor of the estate of such person as such administrator or executor, shall be liable to an action for damages••••" S. D. Rev. Code
(1919), § 29.29; Code (1939), § 37.2201. A similar result was reached in Ehrlich
v. Merritt, (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 251, under the New Jersey statutes.
12 See statute in note 1, supra. Observe that the statute speaks of an action to
recover dama!:es "for a wrongful act, neglect or default," not for a death. Cf. Chief
Justice Johnston's dissenting opinion in Whitford v. Panama R. R., 23 N. Y. 465
(1861).
13 Martinelli v. Burke, (Mass. 1937) ION. E. (2d) u3; Hegel v. George, 218
Wis. 327, 259 N. W. 862, 261 N. W. 14 (1935).
14 Mass. Acts (1938), c. 278, Ann. Laws (Michie, Supp. 1939), c. 229, § 5A:
"The causing of a death under such circumstances as would create liability under
section .•• five on the part of a person, if alive at the time of such death, shall create
a like liability on his part if such death occurs after his own death.••."
The Wisconsin survival statute providing that actions for wrongful death shall
survive the death of the wrongdoer was amended by adding the following: "whether
or not the death of the wrongdoer occurred before or after the death of the injured
person." Wis. Laws (1937), c. 189. By this same chapter (c. 189) the wrongful death
statute was amended to include such phrases as "although such wrongdoer shall die
prior to the time of death of such injured person," and "notwithstanding his prior
death."

